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Robert Chapman (2021). Neurodiversity and the Social Ecology of Mental Functions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 16(6), 1360-1372. SAGE Publications.

Date de publication
12/02/2021
Identifiant
10.1177/1745691620959833
Auteurs
Robert Chapman
Source
Perspectives on Psychological Science
Détails
16(6), 1360-1372
Type de référence
article
Éditeur
SAGE Publications
Source de métadonnées
crossref

Résumé

In psychiatry, mental dysfunction is typically framed in relation to models that seek to be continuous with physiology or evolutionary biology and that compare individual fitness to a broader functional norm. Proponents of the neurodiversity movement, however, challenge the pathologization of minority cognitive styles and argue that we should reframe neurocognitive diversity as a normal and healthy manifestation of biodiversity. Neurodiversity proponents have thus far drawn on social-relational models of disability to challenge the medical model of disability, but they have not developed an alternative functional analysis to replace conceptions of neurological dysfunction or impairment. Here I clarify and defend the neurodiversity perspective by drawing on ecological functional models that take relational contributions to collectives, and group functioning, into account alongside individual functionality. Using the example of autism as well as recent developments in the study of cognitive diversity, I apply these models to human mental functioning and argue that what I call the ecological model has greater utility for research and practice than the leading psychiatric functional analyses of mental functioning.

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